This paper considers a real-time electricity market involving an independent system operator (ISO) and a group of strategic generators. The ISO operates a market, where generators bid prices at which they are willing to provide power. The ISO makes power generation assignments with the goal of solving the economic dispatch problem and regulating the network frequency. We propose a multirate hybrid algorithm for bidding and market clearing that combines the discrete nature of iterative bidding with the continuous nature of the frequency evolution in the power network. We establish sufficient upper bounds on the interevent times that guarantee that the proposed algorithm asymptotically converges to an equilibrium corresponding to an efficient Nash equilibrium and zero frequency deviation. Our technical analysis builds on the characterization of the robustness properties of the continuous-time version of the bidding update process interconnected with the power network dynamics via the identification of a novel local input-to-state Lyapunov function. Simulations on the IEEE 14-bus system illustrate our results.
and frequency regulation is achieved via primary and secondary controllers at the bottom layers. Research on improving the performance of these layers has mostly developed independently from each other, motivated by their separation in time scales. The increasing penetration of renewables poses significant challenges to this model of operation because of its intermittent and uncertain nature (see, e.g., [2] , [3] ). At the same time, the penetration of renewables also presents an opportunity to rethink the architecture and its hierarchical separation toward the goal of improving efficiency and adaptiveness. A key aspect to achieve the integration of different layers is the characterization of the robustness properties of the mechanisms used at each layer, since variables at the upper layers cannot be assumed in a steady state any more at the lower ones. These considerations motivate our work on iterative bidding schemes combined with continuous physical network dynamics and the correctness analysis of the resulting multirate hybrid interconnected system.
A. Literature review
The integration of economic dispatch and frequency regulation in power networks has attracted increasing attention in the last decades. Many recent works [4] - [11] envision merging the design of primary, secondary, and tertiary control layers for several models of the power network/microgrid dynamics with the aim of bridging the gap between long-term optimization and real-time frequency control. In scenarios where generators are price takers, the literature has also explored the use of market mechanisms to determine the optimal allocation of power generation and to stabilize the frequency with real-time (locational marginal) pricing (see [12] - [15] ). Our present work shares with [16] and [17] the use of dynamic iterative bidding schemes by the independent system operator (ISO), although, in these works, the setting is stochastic, the agents react in a pricetaking manner, and their dynamics is assumed to be decoupled from one another. Instead, Cherukuri and Cortés [18] propose iterative bidding schemes, where the generators are strategic, leading to efficient Nash equilibria where power generation levels minimize the total cost as intended by the ISO. Inspired by [15] and [18] , our work [19] has shown that the integration with the frequency dynamics of the network can also be achieved in scenarios where generators are price setters. However, the integration in [19] relies on a continuous-time model for the bidding process, where the frequency coming from the power network dynamics enters as a feedback signal in the negotiation process. Instead, we account here for the necessarily discrete nature of the bidding process and explore the design of provably correct multirate hybrid implementations that realize this integration. This involves the identification of a strictly decreasing Lyapunov function (compared to the weak Lyapunov function employed in [19] ) that allows us to go beyond the characterization of asymptotic stability of the continuous-time dynamics and establish strong robustness guarantees. These guarantees set the basis for our design here of a provably correct multirate hybrid algorithm implementation.
B. Statement of contributions
We consider an electrical power network consisting of an ISO and a group of strategic generators. The ISO seeks to ensure that the generation meets the load with the minimum operation cost, and the grid frequency is regulated to its nominal value. Each generator seeks to maximize its individual profit and does not share its cost function with anyone. The ISO operates the market, where generators bid prices at which they are willing to provide power, and makes power generation assignments based on the bids and the local frequency measurements. Our goal is to design mechanisms that ensure the stability of the interconnection between the ISO-generator bidding process and the physical network dynamics, while accounting for the different nature (iterative in the first case, evolving in continuous time in the second) of each process. Our starting point is a continuoustime bid update scheme coupled with the physical dynamics of the power network whose equilibrium corresponds to an efficient Nash equilibrium and zero frequency deviation. Our first contribution is the characterization of the robustness properties of these dynamics against additive disturbances. To achieve this, we identify a novel local Lyapunov function that includes the energy function of the closed-loop system. The availability of this function not only leads us to establish local exponential convergence to the desired equilibrium, but also allows us rigorously establish its local input-to-state (LISS) stability properties. Building on these results, our second contribution develops a time-triggered hybrid implementation that combines the discrete nature of iterative bidding with the continuous nature of the frequency evolution in the power network. In our design, we introduce two iteration loops, one (faster) inner loop for the bidding process that incorporates at each step the frequency measurements, and one (slower) outer loop for the market clearing and the updates in the power generation levels, that are sent to the continuous-time power network dynamics. We refer to this multirate hybrid implementation as time-triggered because we do not necessarily prescribe the time schedules to be periodic. To analyze its convergence properties, we regard the time-triggered implementation as an approximation of the continuous-time dynamics and invoke the robustness properties of the latter, interpreting as a disturbance their mismatch. This allows us to derive explicit upper bounds on the length between consecutive triggering times that guarantee that the time-triggered implementation remains asymptotically conver- (2) gent. The computation of these upper bounds does not require knowledge of the efficient Nash equilibrium. Simulations on the IEEE 14-bus power network illustrate our results.
Notation: Let R, R ≥0 , R > 0 , Z ≥0 , and Z ≥1 be the set of real, nonnegative real, positive real, nonnegative integer, and positive integer numbers, respectively. For m ∈ Z ≥1 , we use the shorthand notation [m] = {1, . . . , m}. For A ∈ R m ×n , we let A denote the induced 2-norm. Given v ∈ R n , A = A T ∈ R n ×n , we denote v 2 A := v T Av. The notation 1 ∈ R n is used for the vector whose elements are equal to 1. The Hessian of a twice-differentiable function f : R n → R is denoted by ∇ 2 f .
II. POWER NETWORK FREQUENCY DYNAMICS
Here, we present the model of the physical power network that describes the evolution of the grid frequency. The network is represented by a connected undirected graph G = (V, E), where nodes V = [n] represent buses and edges E ⊂ V × V are the transmission lines connecting the buses. Let m denote the number of edges, arbitrarily labeled with a unique identifier in [m]. The ends of each edge are also arbitrary labeled with "+" and "−," so that we can associate to the graph the incidence matrix D ∈ R n ×m given by
A spanning tree T is as a connected acyclic subgraph of G that contains all vertices of G. The incidence matrix D T associated with T is constructed as in (1) . Each bus represents a control area and is assumed to have one generator and one load. Following [20] , the dynamics at the buses is described by the following swing equations:
corresponds to the edge between nodes i and j. For the asymptotic stability analysis carried out in Sections IV and V, we assume that the load P d is constant. Table I specifies the meaning of the symbols used in the power network model (2) .
The validity of this model relies on the following assumptions, which are standard in the literature on power network dynamics [20] , [21] , and we state here for completeness.
Assumption II.1 (Swing equation model):
For the power network dynamics described by (2), the following hold: 1) Lines are lossless, i.e., the conductance of all lines is zero. This is generally valid for transmission lines. 2) Nodal voltages V i are constant. 3) Reactive power flows are ignored. 4) Network is balanced such that the three-phase network can be analyzed by a single phase. To avoid issues in the stability analysis of (2) due to the rotational invariance of δ (see e.g., [22] ), we introduce a new set of variables. To this end, consider an arbitrary spanning tree T of G, and let D T be its associated incidence matrix. Consider ϕ = D T T δ ∈ R n −1 representing the voltage phase angle differences along the edges of this spanning tree. The physical energy stored in the transmission lines is given by
where
In the following, we assume that, for the power generation P g = P g , there exists an equilibrium col(φ,ω) of (4) that satisfies D T D †T Tφ ∈ (− π 2 , π 2 ) m . The latter assumption is standard and often referred to as the security constraint [20] .
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this section, we formulate the problem statement and then discuss the paper objectives. We start from the power network model introduced in Section II and then explain the gametheoretic model describing the interaction between the ISO and the generators following the exposition of [18] and [23] .
The cost incurred by generator i ∈ [n] in producing P gi units of power is given by
where q i > 0 and c i ≥ 0. The total network cost is then
with Q = diag{q 1 , . . . , q n } and c = col(c 1 , . . . , c n ). Given the cost (6) and the constant power loads P d , the ISO seeks to solve the economic dispatch problem
and, at the same time, regulate the network frequency to its nominal value. Since the function C is strongly convex, there exists a unique optimizer P * g of (7) . However, we assume that the generators are strategic, and they do not reveal their cost functions to anyone, including the ISO. Consequently, the ISO is unable to determine the optimizer of (7) . Instead, it determines the power dispatch according to a market clearing procedure in which each generator submits bids to the ISO.
We consider price-based bidding: each generator i ∈ [n] submits the price per unit electricity b i ∈ R at which it is willing to provide power. Based on these bids, the ISO finds the power generation allocation that minimizes the total generator payment while meeting the load. More precisely, given the bid b = col(b 1 , . . . , b n ), the ISO solves
The optimization problem (8) is linear and may in general have multiple (unbounded) solutions. Among these solutions, let P opt g (b) = col(P opt g 1 (b), . . . , P opt gn (b)) be the optimizer of (8) the ISO selects given bids b. Knowing this process, each generator i aims to bid a quantity b i to maximize its payoff
For an unbounded optimizer, we have
To analyze the clearing of the market, we resort to tools from game theory [24] . To this end, we define the inelastic electricity market game: 1) players: the set of generators [n]; 2) action: for each player i ∈ [n], the bid b i ∈ R; 3) payoff: for each player i ∈ [n], the payoff Π i in (9) . We refer to the game as inelastic, as the load is not affected by the bids b i . For the bid vector, we interchangeably use the notation b ∈ R n and (b i , b −i ) ∈ R n , where b −i represents the bids of all players except i. A bid profile b * ∈ R n is a Nash equilibrium if there exists an optimizer P opt g (b * ) of (8) such that ∀i ∈ [n],
for all b i = b * i and all optimizers P opt gi (b i , b * −i ) of (8). In particular, we are interested in bid profiles that can be associated with economic dispatch. More specifically, a bid b * ∈ R n is efficient if there exists an optimizer P * g of (7) , which is also an optimizer of (8) given bids b = b * and P * gi = arg max
A bid b * is an efficient Nash equilibrium if it is both efficient and a Nash equilibrium. At the efficient Nash equilibrium, the optimal generation allocation determined by (7) coincides with the production that the generators are willing to provide, maximizing their profit (9) . Following the same arguments as in the proof of [23, Lemma 3.2], one can establish the existence and uniqueness of the efficient Nash equilibrium.
Proposition III.1 (Existence and uniqueness of efficient
Nash equilibrium): Let (P * g , λ * ) be a primal-dual optimizer of (7); then, b * = ∇C(P * g )=1λ * is the unique efficient Nash equilibrium of the inelastic electricity market game.
In the scenario described above, neither the ISO nor the individual strategic generators are able to determine the efficient Nash equilibrium beforehand. Our goal is then to design an online bidding algorithm, where ISO and generators iteratively exchange information about the bids, and the generation quantities before the market is cleared and dispatch commands are sent. The algorithm should be truly implementable, meaning that it should account for the discrete nature of the bidding process, and at the same time ensure that network frequency, governed by the continuous-time power system dynamics, is regulated to its nominal value. The combination of these two aspects leads us to adopt a hybrid implementation strategy to tackle the problem.
IV. ROBUSTNESS OF THE CONTINUOUS-TIME BID AND POWER-SETPOINT UPDATE SCHEME
In this section, we introduce a continuous-time dynamics that prescribes a policy for bid updates paired with the frequency dynamics of the power network whose equilibrium corresponds to an efficient Nash equilibrium and zero frequency deviation. In this scheme, generators update their bids in a decentralized fashion based on the power generation quantities received by the ISO, while the ISO changes the generation quantities depending on both the generator bids and the network frequency. This design is a simplified version of the one proposed in our previous work [19] . The main contribution of our treatment here is the identification of a novel Lyapunov function that, beyond helping establish local exponential convergence, allows us to characterize the input-to-state stability properties of the dynamics. We build on this characterization later to develop our time-triggered hybrid implementation that solves the problem outlined in Section III.
A. Bidding Process Coupled With Physical Network Dynamics
Recall from Section III that given bid b i , generator i ∈ [n] wants to produce the amount of power that maximizes its individual profit, given by P des gi := arg max
Hence, if the ISO wants generator i to produce more power than its desired quantity, that is, P gi > P des gi , generator i will increase its bid, and vice versa. Bearing this rationale in mind, the generators update their bids according to
Here, T b ∈ R n ×n is a diagonal positive -definite matrix. Next, we provide an update law for the ISO depending on the bid b ∈ R n and the local frequency of the power network. The ISO updates its actions according to
with parameters ρ, σ, τ λ ∈ R > 0 , and where T g ∈ R n ×n is a diagonal positive-definite gain matrix. The intuition behind the dynamics (12b) is explained as follows. If generator i bids higher than the Lagrange multiplier λ (sometimes referred to as the shadow price [25] ) associated with (8b), then the power generation (setpoint) of node i is decreased, and vice versa. By adding the term with ρ > 0, one can enhance the convergence rate of (12b) (see, e.g., [26] ). We add the feedback signal −σ 2 ω to compensate for the frequency deviations in the physical system. Interestingly, albeit we do not pursue this here, the dynamics (12) could also be implemented in a distributed way without the involvement of a central regulating authority like the ISO.
For the remainder of this paper, we assume that there exists an equilibriumx = col(φ,ω,b,P g ,λ) of (4)- (12) such that D T D †T Tφ ∈ (−π/2, π/2) m (cf., Section II). Note that this equilibrium satisfies
In particular, at the steady state, the frequency deviation is zero, the power balance 1 TP g = 1 T P d is satisfied, and 1λ =b = ∇C(P g ), implying thatP g is a primal optimizer of (7) andb is an efficient Nash equilibrium by Proposition III.1. Hence, at the steady state, the generators do not have any incentive to deviate from the equilibrium bid.
B. LISS Stability
While the ISO dynamics (12b) is a saddle-point dynamics of the linear optimization problem (8) (and hence, potentially unstable), we show next that the interconnection of the physical power network dynamics (4) with the bidding process (12) is locally exponentially stable and, furthermore, robust to additive disturbances. First, inspired by our previous work [19] , we define the function
where x = col(ϕ, ω, b, P g , λ). Then, the closed-loop system obtained by combining (4) and (12) is compactly written aṡ
with
By exploiting the structure of the system, we obtain the dissipation inequalitẏ
However, since R := − 1 2 (A + A T ) is only positive semidefinite, V is not strictly decreasing along the trajectories of (15) . Nevertheless, one can employ this function (cf., [19] ) and invoke the LaSalle invariance principle to characterize the local asymptotic convergence properties of the dynamics. Here, we show that, in fact, the dynamics is LISS stable, as defined in [27] , and therefore robust to additive disturbances. Our key tool to establish this is the identification of a LISS Lyapunov function, which, in general, is far from trivial for dynamics that involve saddle-point dynamics. To this end, consider the systeṁ
for some B ∈ R 4n ×q and disturbance signal d ∈ R q . While the function V defined in (14) does not qualify for being a LISS Lyapunov function, the next result shows that adding suitable cross terms to it yields an LISS Lyapunov function for the system (17) .
Theorem IV.1 (LISS Lyapunov function for the interconnected dynamics):
Consider the interconnected dynamics (17) and define the function
with parameters = col( 0 , 1 , 2 , 3 ) ∈ R 4 > 0 and V given by (14) . Given the equilibriumx = col(φ,ω,b,P g ,λ) of (15),
Then, there exist sufficiently small such that W is a LISS Lyapunov function of (17) on Ω. In particular, there exist constants α, χ, c 1 , c 2 > 0 such that for all x ∈ Ω and all d satisfying
We refer to Appendix A for the proof of Theorem IV.1. Using the characterization (20) and [28, Th. 4.10] , each trajectory of (15) initialized in a compact level set contained in Ω exponentially converges to the equilibriumx corresponding to economic dispatch and the efficient Nash equilibrium. Moreover, we exploit the LISS property of (17) guaranteed by Theorem IV.1 next to develop a time-triggered hybrid implementation.
V. TIME-TRIGGERED IMPLEMENTATION: ITERATIVE BID UPDATE AND MARKET CLEARING
In realistic implementations, the bidding process between the ISO and the generators is not performed continuously. Given the availability of digital communications, it is reasonable to instead model it as an iterative process. Building on the continuous-time bidding dynamics proposed in Section IV, here, we develop a time-triggered hybrid implementation that combines the discrete nature of bidding with the continuous nature of the frequency evolution in the power network. We consider two time scales: one (faster) for the bidding process that incorporates at each step the frequency measurements and the other one (slower) for the market clearing and updates of the power generation levels that are sent to the power network dynamics. We refer to this implementation as time-triggered because we do not necessarily prescribe the time schedules to be periodic in order to guarantee that the asymptotic stability properties are retained by the hybrid implementation.
A. Algorithm Description
We start with an informal description of the iterative update scheme between the ISO and the generators, and the interconnection with the dynamics of the power network.
Informal description: The algorithm has two time indices: k to label the iterations on the bidding process and l to label the iteration in the market clearing process that updates the power setpoints. At each iteration l ∈ Z ≥0 , ISO and generators are involved in an iterative process, where, at each subiteration k, generators send a bid to the ISO. Once the ISO has obtained the bids and the network frequency measurements at time t l k , it computes the new potential generation allocations, denoted P k + 1 g ∈ R n , and sends the corresponding one to each generator. At the (k + 1)th subiteration, each generator adjust its bid based on their previous bid and the generation allocation received from the ISO at time t l k + 1 . Once k = N l ∈ Z ≥1 at time t l N l , the market is cleared, meaning that the bidding process is reset (i.e., k = 0), the power generations in the swing equations are updated according to the current setpoints P N l g , and the index l moves to l + 1. Fig. 1 shows the two iteration layers in the update scheme. The evolution of the frequency occurs in continuous time according to (4) . To relate iteration numbers with time instances on R, we consider time sequences of the form {{t l k } N l k =0 } ∞ l=0 , which satisfy
Here, N l ∈ Z ≥1 is the number of bid iterates before the bidding process of market clearing instance l ∈ Z ≥0 stops (see Fig. 1 ). Algorithm 1 formally describes the iterative updates of the bidding process between the generators and the ISO. For analysis purposes, we find it convenient to represent the dynamics resulting from the combination of Algorithm 1 and the network dynamics (4) as the time-triggered continuous-time systeṁ
. . , N l − 1}. We write the system (22) compactly in the forṁ 
h(x) = col(0, M −1 P g , 0, 0, 0).
With this notation, note that the continuous-time dynamics (15) corresponds tȯ
Since sup ϕ∈R n −1 ∇ 2 U (ϕ) < ∞ and g, h are linear, it follows that f, g, and h are globally Lipschitz (we denote by L f , L g , and L h their Lipschitz constants, respectively). When viewed as a continuous-time system, the dynamics (22) has a discontinuous right-hand side, and therefore, we consider its solutions in the Carathéodory sense (cf., [29] ).
B. Sufficient Condition on Triggering Times for Stability
In this section, we establish conditions on the time sequence that guarantee that the solutions of (22) are well defined and retain the convergence properties of (15) . Specifically, we determine a sufficient condition on the intersampling times t l k +1 − t l k for bidding and t l+1 k − t l k for market clearing that ensure local asymptotic convergence of (23) to the equilibriumx of the continuous-time system (15) .
Our strategy to accomplish this relies on the robustness properties of (15) characterized in Theorem IV.1 and the fact that the time-triggered implementation, represented by (23), can be regarded as an approximation of the continuous-time dynamics, represented by (24) . We use the Lyapunov function W defined by (18) and examine the mismatch between both dynamics to derive upper bounds on the interevent times that guarantee that W is strictly decreasing along the time-triggered system (22) .
Theorem V.1 (Local asymptotic stability of timetriggered implementation):
Consider the time-triggered implementation (22) of the interconnection between the ISOgenerator bidding processes and the power network dynamics. With the notation of Theorem IV.1, let
where 0 < β < α, L := L f + L g + L h , and L W is the Lipschitz constant of ∇W . Assume that the time sequence {{t l k } N l k =0 } ∞ l=0 satisfies, for some ζ ∈ (0, ζ) and ξ ∈ (0, ξ), the following:
for all l ∈ Z ≥0 and k ∈ [N l ]. Then,x is locally asymptotically stable under (22) . We refer the reader to Appendix B for the proof of Theorem V.1. The uniform lower bounds ζ and ξ in (26) ensure that the solutions of the time-triggered implementation (22) are well defined, avoiding Zeno behavior. Theorem V.1 implies that convergence is guaranteed for any constant stepsize implementation, where the sufficiently small stepsize satisfies (26) . However, the result of Theorem V.1 is more general and does not require constant stepsizes. Another interesting observation is that the upper bounds can be calculated without requiring any information about the equilibriumx. This is desirable, as this equilibrium is not known beforehand and must be determined by the algorithm itself.
Remark V.2 (General cost functions, generator box constraints, and elastic demand):
We briefly discuss here the feasibility and challenges involved in extending the present treatment along different directions.
General cost functions:
The results presented above also hold for general convex (instead of quadratic) cost functions. Specifically, if there exist c 1 , c 2 ∈ R > 0 such that 0 ≺ c 1 I ∇ 2 C(P g ) c 2 I for all P g ∈ R n , then one can establish LISS of the closed-loop system and compute bounds on the interevent times to guarantee local asymptotic stability. However, this setting requires a significant more technical derivation, and therefore, it is omitted in the present work. Generator box constraints: An interesting extension would be the inclusion in (7) of box constraints on power generation. Such an extension would require the re-examination of the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria, as generators may take advantage of them to arbitrarily increase their individual profit, and the modification of the proposed algorithm to accommodate these constraints, e.g., by using projections in the dynamics. The latter makes it difficult to assess LISS as the characterization of the input-to-state stability properties of projected dynamics systems is still open. Elastic demand: Our treatment here has considered inelastic loads. If instead loads are flexible, i.e., the demand is elastic, then consumers would also react to prices, possibly in a pricetaking manner as in a Cournot-type of competitive market. This implies that the game-theoretic model has to be revised to accommodate loads that change with generator bids/prices. The investigation of how to carry this out is an interesting topic for future research. •
VI. SIMULATIONS
In this section, we illustrate the convergence properties of the interconnected time-triggered system (22) . We consider the IEEE 14-bus power network depicted in Fig. 2, where each node has one generator and one load according to model (2) . We assume costs at each node i ∈ [14] of the form
with q i > 0 and c i ≥ 0. In the original IEEE 14-bus benchmark model, nodes 1, 2, 3, 6, and 8 have synchronous generators, while the other nodes are load nodes and have no power generation. We replicate this by suitably choosing the cost at the load nodes such that the optimizer of the economic dispatch problem (7) At time t = 0 s, the inelastic load (in MWs) is given by P d = (0, 20, 86, 43, 7, 10, 0, 0, 27, 8, 3, 6, 12, 14) .
Initially, we set (q 1 , q 2 , q 3 , q 6 , q 8 ) = (22, 128, 45, 60, 30) , (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 6 , c 8 ) = (7.5, 7.5, 7.5, 7.5, 7.5), and q i = 1500, c i = 26 for the remaining nodes. The time-triggered system (22) is initialized at the steady state at the optimal generation level (P g 1 , P g 2 , P g 3 , P g 6 , P g 8 ) = (85, 15, 42, 31, 63) and with P gi = 0 for all other nodes. Figs. 3-5 depict the simulation of the time-triggered system for different triggering times. At t = 1 s, all the loads are increased by 10%, and we set c i = 28 for the load nodes. As observed in all figures, the trajectories converge to a new efficient equilibrium with optimal power generation level (P g 1 , P g 2 , P g 3 , P g 6 , P g 8 ) = (94, 16, 46, 34, 69) and P gi = 0 for all other nodes. Furthermore, at the steady state, the generators all bid equal to the Lagrange multiplier, which, by Proposition III.1, corresponds to an efficient Nash equilibrium. At t = 15 s, the cost functions of the generators are changed to (q 1 , q 2 , q 3 , q 6 , q 8 ) = (23, 116, 48, 63, 38) , (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 6 , c 8 ) = (7.5, 6, 13.5, 15, 10.5) , and q i = 1500, c i = 33 for the remaining nodes. As a result, the optimal dispatch of power changes. Due to the changes of the power generation, a temporary frequency imbalance occurs. As illustrated in Figs. 3-5 , the power Fig. 3 . Simulations of the interconnection between the iterative bidding mechanism and the power network dynamics modeled by the timetriggered system (22) . The colors in the graph correspond to the nodes, as depicted in Fig. 2 . We choose identical interevent times given by t l k − t l k −1 = 2 ms, t l 0 − t l −1 0 = 50 ms for all l ∈ Z ≥1 , k ∈ [25] . As expected, the time-triggered system is asymptotically stable for sufficiently fast updates. (a) Evolution of the frequency deviations. After each sudden supply-demand imbalance, frequency is restored to its nominal value. (b) Evolution of the nodal power generations. After each change in the network, the power generation quantities converge to the optimal values determined by (7) . (c) Evolution of the bids and the Lagrange multiplier (dashed black line). As shown, the bids converge to the unique efficient Nash equilibrium. Fig. 4 . Simulations of the time-triggered system (22) under time-varying step sizes. We choose the time between two consecutive bid iterations randomly between 0.5 ms ≤ t l k − t l k −1 ≤ 2 ms, for all l ∈ Z ≥1 , k ∈ [N l ], and we choose the number of bid iterations N l ∈ Z before market clearing occurs randomly in the interval [20, 80] . Since the step sizes are sufficiently small, and therefore the mismatch of the time-triggered system with its continuous-time variant, the performance is similar compared to (22) . Here, we consider the case t l k − t l k −1 = 2 ms, t l 0 − t l −1 0 = 160 ms for all l ∈ Z ≥1 , k ∈ [80]. The scenario is the same as in Fig. 3 . In this case, however, the interconnected time-triggered system is only marginally stable; a small increase in either of the interevent times results in an unstable system. (a) Compared to Fig. 3(a) , there are more oscillations and a larger overshoot of the frequency deviations. (b) Evolution of the power generations at each node. (c) Evolution of the bids and the Lagrange multiplier. Compared to Fig. 3(c) , more oscillations in the bids occur. Fig. 6 . Simulations of swing equations with the primary/secondary and tertiary control layers separated. At time t = 1 s, the load is increased as in Fig. 3 , and decentralized primary/secondary controllers are activated to regulate the frequency, but, as a result, optimal power sharing is lost. At t = 14 s, the tertiary control layer is activated by resetting the setpoints optimally. After the change of the cost functions at t = 15 s, economic optimality is temporary lost again until the next time the tertiary control layer is activated (typically in the order of minutes). (a) Evolution of the frequency deviations. Compared to Figs. 3(a) and 4(a) , there are more oscillations in the frequency deviations. (b) Evolution of each power generation. After primary and secondary controllers are activated at t = 1 s, optimal power sharing is lost. (c) Evolution of the total generation costs (in black) compared to the optimal values calculated by (7) . Activation of primary/secondary control, and changes in the cost function result in a loss of efficiency.
generations converge to the new optimal steady state given by (P g 1 , P g 2 , P g 3 , P g 6 , P g 8 ) = (108, 23, 40, 28, 60).
In addition, we observe that after each change of either the load or the cost function, the frequency is stabilized, and the bids converge to a new efficient Nash equilibrium. The fact that the frequency transients are better in Figs. 3 and 4 (with interevent times of maximal 2 ms for bidding and on average, respectively, 50 ms and 62.5 ms for market clearing) than in Fig. 5 (with interevent times of 2 ms for bidding and 160 ms for market clearing) is to be expected given the longer interevent times in the second case. A slight increase in the interevent times for Fig. 5 in either bid updating or market clearing time results in an unstable system. Fig. 6 illustrates the evolution of the interconnected system with the primary/secondary and tertiary control layers separated and its loss of efficiency compared to the proposed integrated design.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper has studied the joint operation of the economic dispatch and frequency regulation layers, which are traditionally separated in the control of power networks. The starting point of our design was a continuous-time bid update scheme coupled with the frequency dynamics, whose equilibrium corresponds to an efficient Nash equilibrium and zero frequency deviation. Building on the identification of a novel LISS Lyapunov function for this dynamics, we have characterized its robustness properties against additive disturbances. We have exploited the LISS property to propose a provably correct multirate hybrid implementation that combines the iterative nature of the fast bid updates and the slower power setpoint updates with the continuous frequency network dynamics. Our results show that realtime iterative bidding can successfully be interconnected with frequency control to increase efficiency, while retaining stability of the power system. Future work will incorporate elastic demand, generator bounds, and power flow constraints in the formulation. We also wish to explore more general bids including piecewise constant and linear supply functions. Finally, we aim to develop distributed and opportunistic self-triggered implementations of the proposed dynamics and characterize the convergence properties of data-driven optimization algorithms.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF THEOREM IV.1
We structure the proof of Theorem IV.1 in two separate parts, corresponding to inequalities (20a) and (20b), respectively.
A. Positive Definiteness of the Lyapunov Function W
Letx be the equilibrium of (15) satisfying the hypothesis. We now prove the existence of constants c 1 , c 2 , 0 > 0 such that (20a) holds, given the constants 1 , 2 , 3 > 0. The Hessian of W [see (18) ] is given by a block-diagonal matrix ∇ 2 W (x) = blockdiag(H 1 (ϕ), H 2 ) with the upper left block as
and the lower right block is given by
We will now show that there exists sufficiently small 0 such that H 1 (ϕ), H 2 are both positive definite for all x ∈ Ω. To this end, let us define the function
and note that U( (19) . Consequently, for D :
By considering the Schur complements, the matrices K 1 and H 2 are shown to be positive definite by choosing 0 > 0 sufficiently small such that
Next, we define c 1 := min{λ min (K 1 ), λ min (H 2 )} (29)
where λ min (A) and λ max (A) denote the smallest and largest eigenvalue of the matrix A ∈ R n ×n . Note that c 1 , c 2 > 0 and the following holds:
Next, we will show that there exists 0 , 1 , 2 , 3 > 0 such that Ξ is positive definite. This can be done by successive use of the Schur complement. In particular, for A ∈ R n ×n , B ∈ R n ×m , C ∈ R m ×m , β > 0, recall that
For successively applying this result to Ξ , given by (35), let us first fix 1 , 3 > 0. Then, 2 can be chosen sufficiently large such that lower right 3 × 3 block submatrix of Ξ is positive definite. Then, we can choose a 0 > 0 sufficiently small such that (28) holds and Ξ > 0. Here, note that choosing 0 smaller does not affect the positive definiteness of the lower right 3 × 3 block submatrix of Ξ . By construction of 0 , 1 , 2 , 3 , there exist constants c 1 , c 2 ∈ R > 0 such that (20a) holds for all x ∈ Ω (see also Appendix A-A). In addition, for this choice of , we have that Ξ > 0, and as a result, there existsα := 1 2 0 λ min (P T Ξ P) > 0 such that
for all x ∈ Ω. Next, we consider the case when the disturbance is present. Let χ satisfy 0 < χ <α/(L W B ). Then, by exploiting the Lipschitz property of ∇W , we obtain
with α :=α − L W B χ > 0, and thus, (20b) holds. This concludes the proof of Theorem IV.1.
APPENDIX B PROOF OF THEOREM V.1
Here, we prove Theorem V.1. To do so, we rely on Gronwall's inequality, which, in general, allows us to bound the evolution of continuous-time and discrete-time signals described by differential and difference equations, respectively. Given the hybrid nature of the time-triggered dynamics (22) , we rely on a version of Gronwall's inequality for hybrid systems developed in [30] . Adapted for our purposes, it states the following.
Proposition B.1 (Generalized Gronwall's inequality [30]):
Let t → y(t) ∈ R be a continuous signal, t → p(t) ∈ R be a continuously differentiable signal, r := {r j } k −1 j =0 be a nonnegative sequence of real numbers, q ≥ 0 a constant, and E := {t j } k +1 j =0 , k ∈ Z ≥0 be a sequence of times satisfying t j < t j +1 for all j ∈ {0, . . . , k}. Suppose that for all t ∈ [t 0 , t k +1 ], the elements y, p, and r satisfy
Then
We are now ready to prove Theorem V.1. Proof of Theorem V.1: Let {{t l k } N l k =0 } ∞ l=0 be a sequence of times satisfying the hypotheses. Consider a trajectory t → x(t) of (22) with x(0) belonging to a neighborhood ofx. The definition of this neighborhood will show up later. Our proof strategy involves showing the monotonic decrease of the function W [cf., (18) ] along this arbitrarily chosen trajectory. Consider any t ∈ R ≥0 such that t ∈ {t l k } N l k =0 for any l ∈ Z ≥0 and x(t) ∈ Ω, where Ω is defined by (19) . With a slight abuse of notation, let l and k ∈ {0, . . . , N l − 1} be fixed such that t ∈ (t l k , t l k +1 ). Then, using the expression of F (x) = f (x) + g(x) + h(x) given in (24) , one can write the evolution of x at t for the considered trajectory aṡ
.
(I) Dissipation inequality: Note that at t, the evolution of W is equal to the dot product between the gradient of W and right-hand side of the above equation. Hence, we obtaiṅ
From (20b), we have ∇W (x(t)) F (x(t)) ≤ −α x(t) −x 2 . Moreover, since maps ∇W , g, and h are globally Lipschitz and ∇W (x) = 0, one has ∇W (x(t)) ≤ L W x(t) −x , g(x(t l k )) − g(x(t)) ≤ L g x(t l k ) − x(t) , and h(x(t l 0 )) − h(x(t)) ≤ L h x(t l 0 ) − x(t) . Using these bounds in (39), we obtaiṅ
Next, we provide bounds on
To reduce the notational burden, we drop the superscript l from the time instances
In addition, we define
(II) Bounds on x(t) − x(t l k ) : Note that x(t) can be written using (23) as the line integral
Above, we have added and subtracted ζ k (t)f (x k ) and subtracted f (x) + g(x) + h(x) asx is an equilibrium. Using Lipschitz bounds and triangle inequality in (41), we obtain
We wish to obtain an upper bound on x(t) − x k that is independent of the state at times s ∈ (t k , t). To this end, we employ Gronwall's inequality as stated in its general form in Proposition B.1. Drawing a parallelism between the notations, for (42), we consider E = ∅, r = 0,
With these choices, the hypothesis (36) is satisfied (as it exactly corresponds to (42) above). Then, with the notation of Proposition B.1, we have
and (37) reads as
Bounding the above inequality using the triangle inequality collecting coefficients of x(t) − x k on the left-hand side and rearranging gives As done before, on the right-hand side, we add and subtract the terms ξ l (t)f (x 0 ) and ξ l (t)g(x 0 ) and then subtract f (x) + g(x) + h(x). This gives us
By defining L := L f + L g + L h , taking the norms, using the global Lipschitzness, we obtain from above
Consider anyt ∈ [t, t k +1 ] and note that ζ k (t) ≤ ζ k (t). Using this bound and the fact that the first term in the above summation is zero, we write
We now apply Proposition B.1 to give a bound for the lefthand side independent of x(s), s ∈ (t 0 , t]. In order to do so, the elements corresponding to those in the Gronwall's inequality are: E = {t j } k j =0 ∪ {t}, y(t) = x(t) − x 0 , p(t) = ξ l (t)L x 0 −x , q = L f , r j = L g ζ j +2
j +1 for j = 0, . . . , k − 2, and r k −1 =t − t k . From Proposition B.1, we obtain
where h(s, t) = exp t s L f dT + k −2 j =i(s) log(1 + ζ j +2 j +1 L g ) + log(1 + L g ζ k (t)) and i(s) is as defined in Proposition B.1. Using log(1 + x) ≤ x for x ≥ 0 and the fact that the exponential is a monotonically increasing function, we obtain
By noting that s ≤ i(s) + 1 and t ≤t, we can upper bound the right-hand side as h(s, t) ≤ exp L f (t − s) + L g (t − s) . Sincet was chosen arbitrarily in the interval [t, t k +1 ], we pick it equal to t. Thus, h(s, t) ≤ exp ((L g + L f )(t − s)). Substituting this inequality in (45) yields
This inequality when used in the right-hand side of the triangle inequality x 0 −x ≤ x(t) − x 0 + x(t) −x yields after rearrangement the following:
Subsequently, using the above bound in (46) gives
Combining inequalities (44) and (47), we obtain
(IV) Monotonic decrease of W : Note first that following (48) and using the bound ξ l (t) ≤ξ yields
Using the definition ofξ, one obtains e (L f +L g )ξ − 1 = β (L f +L g ) L (L W L h +β ) . Substituting this value into the above inequality and simplifying the expression gives us
In a similar way, using the bound on ξ l (t) and substituting the value of e (L f +L g )ξ − 1 in (49) and simplifying yields
Note that ζ k (t) ≤ζ. Using this bound and the definition ofζ in the above inequality gives
Finally, substituting (50) and (51) into (40) and using the fact that β < α, we obtainẆ (x(t)) < 0. Recall that t ∈ R ≥0 was chosen arbitrarily satisfying t ∈ {t l k } N l k =1 for any l ∈ Z ≥0 . Therefore, W monotonically decreases at all times along the trajectory except for a countable number of points. Furthermore, the map t → W (x(t)) is continuous. Therefore, we conclude that the trajectory initialized in a compact level set of W contained in Ω converges asymptotically to the equilibrium pointx. This completes the proof.
